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Abstract
This study builds on structural elaboration theory by developing a model to explain the adoption
of board structures that appear to conform to the prevailing institutional logic, but that in fact
contradict it. We test our theory with the case of CEO-only board structures, a formal increase in
board independence that prior research has shown to lead to greater CEO entrenchment rather
than increased shareholder value. Using an event history analysis of the Fortune 250 over a 27year period, we examine three mechanisms that drive its adoption: executive interests, executive
power and elaboration opportunities. We show that the CEO-only structure is more likely to
occur in firms where a higher proportion of insiders predate the CEO and where the CEO has
greater formal power and agenda control. We also find that powerful CEOs are more likely to
realize the structural change following institutional opportunities like the passage of Sarbanes
Oxley and organizational contingencies like positive changes in firm performance. By exploring
the mechanisms leading to the proliferation of the CEO-only structure, our study contributes to
socio-political perspectives on corporate governance as well as to theories of institutional logics
and structural elaboration.

A key proposition underlying much of corporate governance research, both from agency
theory and socio-political perspectives, is that inside directors are beholden to the CEO and that a
greater proportion of inside directors on the board indicates greater CEO power and board
control (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003; Westphal & Zajac,
1995). Underlying this proposition is the idea that outside directors can more capably monitor
the  CEO’s  activities,  whereas  inside  directors  are  prone  to  capture  and  ill-equipped to contravene
the  CEO’s  inclinations  (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Winter, 1977; Zajac & Westphal, 1996).
This view has widely influenced key institutional actors such as public interest groups,
government regulators, and institutional investors in the United States. Beginning in the 1980s
and continuing to the present day, these actors have successfully pushed for a decline in the
number of inside directors on corporate boards (American Law Institute, 1982, Council of
Institutional Investors, 1989, New York Stock Exchange, 2003).
The conceptualization of inside directors as pawns of the CEO is part of a broader
concern with board independence and the rise of the institutional logic of shareholder value
(Lok, 2010; Shipilov, Greve & Rowley, 2010; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). The shareholder
value logic is based on agency theory, which holds that the sole purpose of the firm is to
maximize shareholder value. The object of the board of directors is to ensure that the end of
shareholder value maximization predominates over executive interests and entrenchment (Fama
& Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Accordingly, outside directors should hold a
majority of the  board’s  seats in order to effectively maintain decision control and sanction the
CEO when needed (cf., Mizruchi, 1983). Thus the shareholder value logic specifies the

relationship between the CEO, insiders and outsiders on the board and the rationale for board
independence as a mechanism to align the interests and actions of management and shareholders.
The rise of the shareholder value logic and the concomitant increase in board
independence has led to a supermajority of outside directors in U.S. corporate boards (Spencer
Stuart, 2011). However, less recognized is the rising number of corporations in which the CEO
is the only insider in the board – what we refer to as the CEO-only structure (c.f., Adams,
Almeida & Ferreira, 2005). Although increasingly prevalent, neither agency theory, nor
regulatory, stock exchange or professional standards call for the CEO-only structure. In fact,
CEO-only boards have proliferated in direct contravention to calls to separate the CEO and the
Chairman positions (e.g., Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1997; Finkelstein,
Hambrick & Cannella, 2009), which have not been widely heeded (Spencer Stuart, 2011).
While CEO-only boards may appear to be a natural outgrowth of the pursuit of board
independence, their increasing prevalence is also somewhat paradoxical. Recent research by
both finance and management scholars suggests that the CEO-structure actually increases a
CEO’s  power and influence. For example, the CEO-only structure leads to diversification
discounts (Hoechle, Schmid, Walter& Yermak, 2012), monitoring inefficiencies (Liu & Jiraporn,
2008), and greater CEO influence (Adams et al, 2005). Unlike other structural and practice
reforms that were prompted by the shareholder value revolution throughout 1980s and 90s (e.g.,
Davis & Stout, 1992; Davis et al, 1994; Fligtein, 2001; Fligstein & Markowitz, 1993,
Zuckerman, 2000), these more recent findings provide evidence that CEO-only boards actually
contradict  agency  theory’s prescriptions by enhancing CEOs’  entrenchment  and  interests.    Given
evidence that CEOs in U.S. corporations have circumvented the limits on their control imposed

by the diffusion of the shareholder value logic through a variety of mechanisms (Davis, 1991;
Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Westphal, 1998; Westphal & Khanna, 2003; Goldstein, 2012), this
begs the question: What role has the CEO played in determining the CEO-only board?
To explain the paradoxical spread of the CEO-only board structure, we draw from and
extend structural elaboration theory (Edelman, 1992) and apply it to analyze the adoption of the
CEO-only structure. In  Edelman’s  (1992)  original  formulation,  the  theory  referenced  how  legal
mandates were often ambiguous, allowing organizations to adopt formal structures that appeared
to conform, while designed instead to foster managerial interests. We extend the theory to the
context of institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012)
and argue that institutional logics are also ambiguous with respect to the specifics of formal
structures, allowing for political processes to shape their structural implementation. Logics
create pressure for structural reform, but the precise way that an organization structurally
responds to this pressure depends on three mechanisms: executive interests, executive power,
and elaboration opportunities.
Executive interests and power, both of which are displayed at the board level, are
intimately connected in this process. Powerful organizational elites strategically respond to new
logics, seeking to adopt structures that ostensibly conform to the logic but that function in
practice to promote their own interests. Whereas conventional wisdom on inside directors would
suggest that the CEO-only structure diverges from CEO interests, we argue that, compared to
other variants of independent majority structures, the CEO-only structure advances the interests
of CEOs by conferring an information brokerage position and eliminating potential internal
contestants for their power and position. Thus we propose that powerful CEOs strategically

respond to institutional pressure for board independence and support the CEO-only structure, an
elaborated version of board independence. The third mechanism we propose, elaboration
opportunities, can occur at either the organization or the institutional level. Elaboration
opportunities are events or contingencies that allow organizational elites to leverage their power
and influence structural change. Whereas the first two mechanisms help to explain why a
particular structure proliferates in response to a newly dominant logic, this final mechanism
helps to explain when structural elaboration is most likely to occur. Ultimately, the confluence
of logics, elaboration opportunities, individual interests and power create decision-making
situations that allow for political activity and instigate processes of structural elaboration.
Empirically, we test our theory with a study of the adoption of the CEO-only structure by
Fortune 250 firms from 1981 to 2007. Throughout this period, the regulatory governance of
boards went through extreme shifts and the logic of shareholder value became increasingly
dominant. From our longitudinal vantage, we are afforded a unique opportunity to observe how
shifts in institutional environments and organizational contexts interacted with the distribution of
CEO power to influence the emergence and diffusion of the CEO-only structure.
Our study offers several contributions. First, we contribute to the socio-political
literature on corporate governance (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Lynall, Golden & Hillman, 2003;
Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, & Donahue, 2007). We build on prior research establishing that
governance structures and policies are symbolically manipulated by corporate leaders in order to
signal conformity with shareholder values while causing minimal disruptions to the actual
balance of power within the corporation (Fiss & Zajac, 2004, 2006; Porac, Wade & Pollock,
1999; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). We extend this line of research by challenging conventional

wisdom that CEOs will always prefer inside directors to outsiders, showing instead that the
greater the power of the CEO, the greater likelihood of adoption of a CEO-only structure. We
propose that this structure offers CEOs informational brokerage advantages relative to outside
directors and increases their status and power inside the organization.
Second, we contribute to the institutional logics literature by highlighting the role of
power in the elaboration of institutional logics. While the role of power has been established in
prior theory and research in institutional logics, it has not been the main focus of this
conversation (cf. Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Prior research has focused on either how
institutional logics shape the determinants of power (e.g., Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), or how
competition between alternative institutional logics is shaped by power struggles between
individual and collective actors (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006;
Reay & Hinings, 2009). The theoretical and empirical focus of this paper -- how executive power
shapes structural responses to institutional logics -- has received limited research attention.
Third,  we  contribute  to  structural  elaboration  theory.    Edelman’s  (1992)  account  of  
elaboration vests structural change in the interaction of regulatory shocks and organizational
interests. Her theory proposes that organizations strategically react to regulatory shifts by
implementing formal structures that further their own interests while signaling conformity to
institutional expectations. Our study extends this theory by discussing its application in the
broader context of institutional logics. Moreover, we draw from socio-political theory to explore
the intra-organizational political dynamics that undergird the process of structural elaboration.
THEORY

Our theory of board structure and composition combines a socio-political perspective on
corporate governance with an examination of changes in institutional logics (Zajac & Westphal,
1996; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Green, Babb, & Alpaslan, 2008). Institutional logics provide
historically contingent organizing principles and vocabularies of practice that shape individual
and organizational values, beliefs, and behavior (Thornton et al., 2012). During the 1980s, a
logic of shareholder value revolutionized the institutional field of corporate governance
(Fligstein and Shin, 2007; Greenfield, 2012). This logic was ideologically rooted in agency
theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and promoted shareholder wealth
maximization as the guiding principle for corporate managers and boards of directors. In light of
the logic, corporate leaders were urged to take necessary steps to align managerial incentives
with  the  interests  of  the  firm’s  stakeholders  (Fligstein  and  Shin,  2007).      Organizational theorists
have  extensively  documented  the  logic’s impact on U.S. corporations throughout this period, as
it promoted widespread corporate reorganizations, revisions to employment processes, and
amended governance structures (Davis, 2009; Davis, Diekmann and Tinsley, 1994; Davis and
Thompson, 1994; Useem, 1993; 1996; Zorn et al., 2005). The shareholder value logic has also
shaped corporate governance practices in other countries, but not uniformly so (cf., Fiss and
Zajac; Lok, 2010; Shipilov et. al., 2010). One particularly ubiquitous change spurred by the logic
was the rise of board independence, which was prescribed as a mechanism for monitoring the
CEO  to  assure  that  their  decisions  aligned  with  shareholders’  interests.    At  the  same  time,  
reformers challenged the insider-dominated boards that were characteristic of the previously
dominant managerial logic by questioning their monitoring capabilities (Mizruchi, 1983;
Weisbach, 1988).

While institutional logics provide the guiding principles for organizational structures and
practices, they do not provide detailed templates for organizing, but instead allow substantial
variation in their implementation (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Lounsbury, 2001, 2008). Prior
research has identified both conforming and anomalous practice variation, but has focused
largely on the latter, holding that anomalous variations lead to changes in institutional logics
both within and across organizations (Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton et al, 2012). One exception is
the study by Shipilov et al. (2010), which studied second wave adoption of board governance
practices in Canada, following the adoption of the logic (and practices) of board reform. They
find that second wave adoption of appropriate forms of variation is positively influenced by firmlevel adoption of practices from the same institutional logics.
Structural elaboration theory provides a new lens to explain why particular practices are
developed and adopted in response to new institutional logics. Structural elaboration theory
proposes that laws often set forth broad and ambiguous principles, subject to interpretation by
organizational actors (Edelman, 1992). Organizations respond to legal requirements by
elaborating formal structures that serve as visible symbols of compliance, but are not always
responsive to the intended purposes of the law. The theory additionally holds that organizational
interests drive the interpretation of law and lead to variations in the structural forms (formal rules
and organizational structures) by which the law is implemented. Specifically, the theory
contends that organizations strategically react to institutional mandates by searching for
structural forms that signal compliance but, in practice, protect and promote the interests of
powerful internal elites. Structural elaboration theory has been developed and tested primarily in
the context of Civil Rights Law and the employment relationship (Edelman, 1992; Kalev &

Dobbin, 2006: Kmec & Skaggs, 2009), but has not yet been applied to explain variations in
corporate governance structures or institutional logics.
Like structural elaboration theory, the institutional logics perspective has highlighted the
role played by interests in the adoption of organizing practices (Thornton et al, 2012). But the
focus of theory and research has been on how power and interests shape competition and rivalry
among alternative institutional logics (Levy & Scully, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Reay
& Hinings, 2009) or how they lead to the transformation and change in logics (Greenwood &
Suddaby, 2006; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Seo & Creed, 2002). Structural elaboration theory adds
to the institutional logics perspective by emphasizing that power and interests can lead to the
adoption of a particular variant of a practice that apparently reinforce existing logics, yet actually
work in practice to contradict underlying theoretical principles.
In this paper, we extend and modify structural elaboration theory by proposing a model to
explain the adoption of structures that symbolically conform to prevailing institutional logics, but
in fact, do not. Our model incorporates three interrelated mechanisms: executive interests,
executive power, and elaboration opportunities. According to our theory, the adoption of formal
structures and practices that appear to reinforce prevailing institutional logics varies across
organizations and over time. We expect the variants that proliferate to be those that align with
the interests of powerful executives, in our case the CEO (cf., Finkelstein, 1992; Pfeffer, 1981).
The timing of the adoption of specific variants will be shaped by environmental events and
organizational contingencies (cf., Zajac, Kraatz & Bresser, 2000). These create elaboration
opportunities that increase the likelihood of adoption of structural variants consistent with both

the prevailing institutional logics and the interests of powerful executives (cf., Kingdon, 1984;
March & Olsen, 1976).
We test our theory via a  longitudinal  analysis  of  U.S.  firms’  adoption  of  the  CEO-only
insider board structure, a symbolic corporate governance structure that elaborates the shareholder
value logic in the United States. Board independence is a guiding principle of the shareholder
value logic, which propones that independent outside directors are better monitors of firm
managers and the CEO (American Law Institute, 1982, Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003;
Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990). While this principle indicates that a majority of the members of the
board should be outsiders without financial ties to the organization, no further specification is
universally agreed upon. This vagueness allows organizations considerable latitude in deciding
how exactly to implement the principle of board independence. Possible variants in
implementation include, for example, the separation of the CEO and Chair position (Dalton &
Kesner, 1987; Westphal & Zajac, 1997), appointment of lead directors (Sonnenfeld, 2004), fully
independent audit committees (Coates, 2007), and supermajority outsider boards (Jensen, 1993).
Although these variants are symbolic manifestations of compliance with the principle of board
independence, their effectiveness in achieving the intended goal of maximizing shareholder
value is at best equivocal. Overall meta-analysis of the effects of board independence on
financial performance shows lack of consistent effects (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson,
1998). And despite the earlier theoretical support for supermajority outsider boards among
agency theorists (e.g, Jensen, 1993), empirical support for their superiority is also limited
(Bhagat & Black, 2001).

The CEO-only insider board is itself a variant of supermajority outsider boards. While
the selection of insiders vs. outsiders is typically considered a question of board composition
rather than structure, having the CEO as the only insider on the board alters the formal and
informal structural relationship between the CEO, other firm executives, and outside directors, in
ways that other forms of supermajority outsider boards do not. The CEO-only structure uniquely
privileges the role of the chief executive in that it creates a structural hole between the
organization and the board of directors, which the CEO can then fill (Burt, 1992). By being the
only insider on the board, the CEO becomes the exclusive formal conduit of information
between management and the board of directors. As no other firm executives are peers of
outside directors as board members, it also reduces the opportunities for informal interactions
between outside directors and other firm executives. This structural change increases  the  board’s  
dependence  on  the  CEO,  in  turn  augmenting  the  CEOs’  influence  and  perceived  value. By
extension, the structure reduces the status and formal power of other senior managers, removing
them  as  contestants  for  the  CEO’s  power  and  position (Ocasio, 1994). Therefore, the CEO-only
structure is critically distinguishable from other forms of independent-majority boards in that it
qualitatively alters the structural relationships between the CEO, outside directors and other
senior executives.
The role of the CEO in fostering the adoption of the CEO-only structure is illustrated by
Lou Gerstner’s  mobilization  of  power  at  IBM.   When Gerstner became CEO in 1993, the board
included three other inside directors. By the start of 1995, only Gerstner remained. The CEOonly  structure  remained  intact  at  IBM  throughout  Gestner’s  tenure  and prevailed until 2012,
when Virginia M. Rometty became CEO, succeeding Sam Palmisetto who remained on the

board for one year as Chairman. According  to  Gerstner’s  own  account,  he  was  concerned  with  
the power of inside directors on the board and mobilized the support of outsiders to reduce the
size of the board and eliminate all other inside directors (Gerstner, 2002: 75-76):
“One  of  the  most  revolutionary,  but  least  noticed,  changes  in  the  early  days  involved  the  
Board of Directors. When I arrived there were eighteen directors, including four
insiders…I  thought  this  was  an  unwieldy  size  with  too  many  insiders,  particularly  given  
the dominance of current and former employees on the powerful Executive Committee.
…Clearly  the  CEO  search,  the  media’s  public  flogging of the company, and the sharp,
extended criticism at the annual meeting had traumatized many members of the board. I
quietly approached a few of them, especially Jim Burke and Tom Murphy, for a series of
discussions  on  corporate  governance…With  my  encouragement,  the  Director’s  
Committee decided it would announce that the board should be reduced in size to make it
more manageable. At the same time, we would add new people to bring in some different
perspectives. After  the  announcement,  it  didn’t  take anyone more than a minute to
realize that meant a significant amount of retirements would be in order. …By  the  end  of  
1994, we had a twelve-member board. I was the only insider. Only eight remained form
the eighteen who had made up the board just year  before.”
As this account illustrates, Gerstner relied on principles of corporate governance to mobilize
support for changes in  the  board’s structure and composition, including the adoption of a CEOonly. In particular, Gerstner’s actions imply that the removal of insiders aligned with his own
interests in that he was able to remove senior managers that had social capital with outside
directors (an asset that he, as newcomer to IBM and its board, had yet to develop), and that had
formal power through membership in the board and its executive committee. By removing
powerful executives from the board, Gerstner managed to increase his relative power on the

board and eliminate potential contestants for his power and position. His ability to do so during
a period of increasing performance indicates an underlying opportunity to advance his interests
and influence. In what follows, we explore each of these themes in greater detail and develop
hypotheses for each of the mechanisms driving CEO-only structure adoption.

Hypotheses
Executive interests. Shifts in institutional logics often compel firms to change their practices or
structures in order to conform to changing institutional expectations. Structural elaboration
theory suggests, however, that organizational responses to new institutional demands do not
always  represent  “a  good  faith  effort  to  comply”  with  the  underlying  impetus  of  an  institutional  
shift (Edelman, 1992: 1567-1568), but are instead often symbolic (Edelman, 2992; Fiss & Zajac,
2006; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Understanding why particular structures and practices
proliferate in response to an institutional shift requires an examination of the interests of the
actors within organizations (Edelman, 1992; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, & Hunt, 1998; Kellogg,
2009). Edelman (1992) further suggests that organizations respond to institutional shifts by
adopting formal structures that symbolically comply with new institutional demands but also
protect the interests of the elites within them.

In light of this, our present effort to explore the

rise of the CEO-only structure in response to the shareholder value logic begins with an
assessment of how the structure simultaneously signals compliance with the logic and promotes
the  CEO’s  interests.
The CEO-only structure provides an especially strong signal of compliance with the
shareholder value logic, as it requires the removal of all insiders from the board, aside from the

CEO, who are, according to the agency perspective, beholden to CEO interests (Hermalin &
Weisbach, 2003; Winter, 1977). We assert, however, that the CEO-only structure works in
practice to promote the CEO’s  interests  in  three distinct ways. Foremost, in the CEO-only board
structure, the CEO becomes the information broker between the senior executives of the
corporation and members of the board of directors, providing the CEO with a unique
informational advantage. Network scholars have long noted the inherent benefits of a brokerage
position between two disconnected parties (Burt, 1992; 1997). Brokers may control the diffusion
of nonredundant information between separate groups and benefit from a disproportionate say in
whose interests are served when the groups come together. Potentially, this increases the relative
dependence  of  outsiders  and  insiders  on  the  CEO  and,  consequently,  the  CEO’s  power  over  both  
parties (Burt, 1997). In the absence of insiders, the CEO can use the brokerage role to regulate
the  flow  of  information  on  the  firm’s  financial  and  strategic  issues.    Outside  directors  are  
dependent on the CEO and other top managers for detailed knowledge and information on the
firm’s  strategy,  operations, and financial performance. This information is particularly important
for outside directors, whose time and attention is limited, as their board membership is most
often a secondary employment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Westphal, 1999). Insider board
membership provides outside directors with more direct access to internal information. Without
other insiders on the board, outside directors are less likely to be exposed to ideas about the
firm’s  strategy  and  performance that differ from those of the CEO. Thus the brokerage position
afforded by the CEO-only structure is  likely  to  amplify  the  CEO’s  control  over  critical  board  
decisions.    It  is  also  likely  to  increase  the  other  directors’  reliance  on  the  CEO  and  lead  them  to  
view the CEO as more valuable, which is supported by empirical evidence that CEOs within a

CEO-only structure are compensated more highly than CEOs on boards with other insiders (Zorn
et al., 2013).1
Second, the CEO-only structure increases the  CEO’s  status  and  power  relative to other
corporate executives. Boards of directors are elite decision-making groups; board membership
comes with direct status and power benefits for inside directors (Finkelstein, 1992; Forbes &
Milliken,  1999;;  Main,  O’Reilly,  &  Wade,  1995). An insider’s loss of (or inability to secure) a
board position may affect their reputations outside as well as inside the company. By being the
only insider on the board, the CEO is advantaged with a source of power and status that other
insiders lack, increasing their relative power.
Third, the CEO-only  structure  removes  contestants  for  the  CEO’s  power  and  position  by  
eliminating potential heirs apparent from the board (Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002).
Moreover, the CEO-only structure increases the CEO’s  control  over other  executives’  exposure  
to the board. CEO candidates often gain exposure to the board of directors through board
membership (Vancil, 1987). Membership provides outside directors with a chance to see
executives in action and evaluate their performance in managing the critical issues of the firm
and to compare them to the CEO. However, in the case of the CEO-only board,  executive’s  
access  to  the  board  is,  for  the  most  part,  contingent  on  the  CEO’s  granting  them  access.    As a
result, the  CEO’s  increased  control  over the exposure that other executives have to the board

While the present paper is concerned primarily with exploring the antecedents of the CEO-only structure rather
than its effects, we have also replicated prior studies of how CEO-only structures increases CEO compensation and
CEO entrenchment with our unique dataset. The results are available from the first author.
1

may shift the dynamics of the succession process to  favor  the  CEO’s  preferences and limit access
to internal contenders for the CEO position (Ocasio, 1994; Shen and Cannella, 2002).
Consequently, a CEO-only-insider  structure  may  increase  the  CEO’s  influence  within the CEO
selection and succession process. Additionally, by removing the potential for a vetted internal
heir apparent, the structure makes it more difficult for the board to remove the CEO, increasing
CEO entrenchment.
Insofar as the CEO-only structure is perceived by CEOs as being in their interest,
structural elaboration theory suggests that CEOs should respond to the proliferating shareholder
value logic by pushing their firms to adopt this structure in symbolic compliance. Of course,
while theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrate that the CEO-only structure does
advantage CEOs, CEOs may not always recognize the CEO-only structure as preferable to a
simple or supermajority independent board. Consequently, we contend that the extent to which a
CEO will be motivated to remove other insiders from the board depends in part on whether the
CEO  recognizes  other  insiders  as  being  allies  or  contestants.    The  CEO’s  interests  in  adopting  the  
CEO-only structure are thus shaped by variations in the composition of inside directors on the
board.
While some inside directors may be staunch allies of the CEO, prior research suggests
that some insiders may  contest  the  CEO’s  power  (Ocasio,  1994).    Extending  this  notion,  we  
propose that inside directors whose appointments predate the CEO are more likely to be political
contestants of the CEO than those who postdate the CEO. Prior work suggests that a CEO is
more likely to have close ties with inside directors appointed during his or her tenure (Kim &
Cannella, 2008). Additionally, a CEO is less likely to be committed to inside directors who were

appointed  by  a  predecessor,  and  they  are  less  likely  to  obtain  these  directors’  support,  compared  
to directors who they helped to appoint (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). Predating insiders
are  also  more  likely  to  have  been  rival  candidates  for  the  CEO’s  position  (cf.,  Vancil,  1987),  
enhancing the likelihood that they are political contestants to the CEO rather than allies. We
suggest, therefore, that CEOs are most likely to recognize the CEO-only structure as being in
their interests when, as in the Gerstner example discussed above, the other insiders on the board
predate the CEO. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the proportion of inside directors appointed prior to the
selection of the current CEO, the more likely the adoption of a CEO-only board
structure.
Executive power. Structural elaboration theory, with its focus on organization-level outcomes,
treats  elites’  ability  to  influence  change  as being uniform across populations of organizations.
However, not all CEOs are uniformly able to influence board structural reform (Zajac and
Westphal, 1996). The socio-political perspective suggests that CEOs’ ability to influence their
organizations depends on the power they exercise relative to other elite constituencies. As CEO
power increases, it becomes more likely that the CEO will influence a firm’s board structure and
composition (Lynall et al., 2003; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). By grafting structural elaboration
theory to the socio-political perspective, we propose a more nuanced model of the mechanisms
driving processes of structural elaboration (Harris et al., 2013). Our theory diverts from prior
work in the socio-political tradition, however, by hypothesizing that powerful CEOs may favor a
structure that eliminates all insiders on the board, rather than increases them.

With the proliferation of the agency logic and its demands for enhanced board
independence over our period of study, insider-dominated boards were no longer an available
option for corporate CEOs. Instead, boards were pressured to signal their conformity to the logic
by having a majority of independent directors. Within independent majority structures, the CEO
is less benefitted by having insiders on the board, as the support of outsiders is necessary to
achieve majority support (Bhagat and Black, 2001). And, as noted above, the CEO-only
structure uniquely benefits CEOs by providing them with an information brokerage position and
limiting contestation from other executives. Therefore, CEOs responding strategically to the
shareholder value logic may press for the CEO-only structure as preferable to other variants of
independent-majority structures.
Mobilization  of  the  CEO’s  power  in  support  of  the  CEO-only structure is likely to be a
function  of  the  CEO’s  agenda  control  and  influence  over  the  nominating  process  rather  than of
an overt conflict with other board members. Outsiders are likely to side with a powerful CEO in
favor of the structure because of its consistency with institutional demands for a stricter board.
While board members are technically nominated by a nominating committee made up of
independent directors, in reality board membership commonly comes via an invitation from the
CEO  (Roe,  1994).    This  makes  the  CEO’s  power  and  influence  particularly  important  for  
structural elaboration in the board setting.
Following Finkelstein (1992), we consider three aspects of the CEO's power: duality,
stock ownership, and functional background. CEO duality increases the CEO's agenda and
information control, shaping which issues the board considers and how it evaluates them.
Furthermore, because dual CEOs also serve as Board Chair, duality increases the CEO's formal

authority over board composition. CEO power also increases with high relative stock ownership,
which affords greater influence through voting rights (Zald, 1969). If the CEO holds a
disproportionate percentage of company stock, she reduces the relative provision of resources by
other directors, alleviates attention given to monitoring by outsiders and advantages her agenda.
Functional background may also serve as a source of power. In particular, CEOs with a
finance background are especially situated to provide information to the board that would
otherwise be provided by the CFO or other key insiders: information on major capital
investments, financing, and major transactions (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley,1994). Finance
CEOs are better equipped to answer investor demands for greater disclosure of corporate
financial information (Matsunaga & Yeung, 2008) and have a greater opportunity to do so in
absence of CFOs. Correspondingly, a finance background may better orient the CEO towards the
greater monitoring requirements associated with the shareholder value logic and concomitant
elaborations in board structure. In all, we suggest that structural elaborations that conform to
prevailing institutional logics while enhancing CEO interests are more likely the more powerful
the CEO.
Hypothesis 2: The greater the power of the CEO in the board, the more likely the
adoption of a CEO-only board structure.
Elaboration opportunities. In the original development of structural elaboration theory, the
coercive effects of institutional shocks in the form of new legislation led to the adoption of new
symbolic structures. Extending the theory to examine variations in structures that reinforce a
prevailing institutional logic, we suggest that both environmental events and organizational
contingencies may trigger opportunities for change (Meyer, 1982; Zajac et al., 2000: Thornton et

al, 2012). These elaboration opportunities moderate the impact of the interest and power
mechanisms discussed previously. Specifically, elaboration opportunities trigger increases in the
power of particular elites within a firm, offering them a window in which to influence structural
elaboration in accordance with their own interests. In this way, elaboration opportunities help to
explain when structural change is most likely to occur in the process of structural elaboration.
Given limitations on the issues that executives can attend to at any given time, the
consideration of alternative governance structures is  likely  to  wax  and  wane  in  the  organization’s  
agenda (March & Olsen, 1976; Ocasio, 1997). Institutional-level  changes  in  an  organization’s  
environment provide elaboration opportunities that shape the timing of the adoption of structural
variants. In the context of the shareholder value logic, following the Enron and WorldComm
scandals, the adoption of Sarbanes Oxley legislation significantly affected the language and
practice of corporate governance (Gordon, 2007). The passage of Sarbanes Oxley (SOX)
triggered a new regime of corporate governance, where board independence received increasing
board attention. Soon after SOX, board independence was further promoted when the major
U.S. stock exchanges all introduced rules requiring listed companies to have a majority of
independent directors on the board (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007). In particular, the passage
of SOX increased the importance of board members with financial expertise who can capably
monitor corporate financial reports. The two primary demands of the law -- mandating
independent audit committees and requiring CEOs and CFOs to personally certify financial
statements – are intended to foster greater financial scrutiny. After SOX, therefore, the power
and perceived importance of CEOs with financial backgrounds was likely enhanced.

Insiders with a particularly unique set of skills or knowledge may increase the relative
dependence that other board members have for them, particularly when those skills are in an area
critical to the firm (Hickson, et al., 1971). This suggests that the introduction of SOX within
organizations’  institutional  environments  likely  engendered  shifts  in  the  political  dynamics  
within boards, augmenting the power of CEOs with financial backgrounds. CEOs with financial
expertise likely leveraged their increased power, influencing their companies to adopt board
structures that best promoted their interests. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: In the post SOX-period, CEOs with financial backgrounds will increase the
likelihood of adopting the CEO-only structure.
While structural elaboration theory has singularly focused on elaboration opportunities
occurring at the institutional (and specifically formal, or regulatory) level, we suggest that
elaboration opportunities also occur at the firm level. Recent theoretical developments in the
institutional logics perspective support this view, as situational contingencies activate highly
accessible institutional logics, in this case the shareholder value logic, and facilitate change in
organizing practices (Thornton et. al. 2012). Particular organizational contingencies can become
elaboration opportunities when they provide powerful elites with a window within which to
enact changes that reflect their own interests as well as the prevailing logic. Such is the case
when firm performance increases during the tenure of a particular CEO.
Unlike structural dimensions of power like CEO duality or relative shareholdings that
increase  a  CEO’s  power  by  directly  augmenting  their  control over board decisions, performance
increases are not inherently a source of board power for CEOs. However, positive changes in
firm performance create an elaboration opportunity because a favorable change in performance is

likely to draw attention to the CEO’s  success and increase the  board’s  evaluation  of  the  CEO’s  
effectiveness, thereby increasing the  CEO’s influence on new board initiatives. A CEO who is
successful  at  improving  the  firm’s  performance will be viewed as having a firm grasp on current
environmental demands and internal challenges. In  these  situations,  the  CEO’s  solutions  to
organizational problems, whether or not they are actually responsible for the performance
increase, become highly valued by the board and gain credence with external monitors like
industry analysts and the media (Hayward, Rindova and Pollock, 2004). Because  the  CEO’s  
interests, strategies and actions will be viewed as aligned with shareholders and in support of
shareholder value, the board is likely to grant greater discretion to the CEO in shaping board
decisions (including that of board membership). Note that at  the  time  of  IBM’s  transition  to  
CEO-only discussed above, Gerstner was well into a successful turnaround effort to cut billions
in expenses and raise cash by selling assets. Thus, performance increases generate opportunities
for CEOs to mobilize power over board members and affect changes consistent with their
interests.
This notion receives additional support within corporate governance research, where
evidence suggests that performance plays a significant role in processes of structural change
(Cannella  &  Shen,  2001;;  Finkelstein  &  D’Aveni,  1994).    Illustratively,  Cannella  and  Shen  
(2001) documented that powerful CEOs are more likely to remove potential rivals when their
firms perform well. While their study focused on heirs apparent, this effect is likely to generalize
to independent majority structures where the CEO would be empowered by being the only
insider on the board. For powerful CEOs, positive changes in firm performance provide

opportunities to adopt structures consistent with both their interests and prevailing institutional
logics. Thus we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: The greater the increase in firm performance, the greater the effect of
CEO power on the likelihood of adoption of CEO-only structures.

METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
This study uses an event history design to examine the adoption of the CEO-only insider
structure. The population for this study includes the largest U.S. firms, as listed in the 1995
Fortune 250. We chose this year because it is the first year that Fortune magazine included both
industrial and service companies in its listings. Given the lack of financial data for 28 of the
companies in the original sample, the sample was reduced to 222 companies. T-tests on the
initial and final samples indicated no significant differences in size, measured as log of sales.
Our unit of observation is the company-year for every company in the population
covering the years 1981-2007. Prior research suggests that during this period corporate
governance -- and board structure in particular -- rose to prominence as a key concern for
corporate stakeholders and regulators in the U.S. The timeframe covers three important periods:
the rise of the institutional investors during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Davis & Thompson,
1994), the scandalous collapses of Enron and Worldcom during 2001, and the following shift in
the regulatory environment engendered by the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley. Some firms were
founded or became publicly held after 1981 and many merged or otherwise ceased to be publicly
held companies prior to 2007. The methodology treats any spells ending prior to 2007 as right

censored at that point. Data on insiders and the board of directors were obtained from the
Standard  and  Poor’s  Register  of  Corporations,  Directors and Executives, Who’s  Who  in  Finance  
and Industry and corporate proxy statements. Revenue, employee data, and other financials were
obtained from COMPUSTAT. All independent variables and controls are lagged. Because of
this lag, we omitted all years in the data in which succession occurred so that the variables we
use to capture CEO power would always reflect the sitting CEO at each firm, rather than the
prior CEO. The final sample includes a total of 2,918 firm-years.
Dependent Variable
To analyze the likelihood of a transition to CEO-only insider status, we created a
dichotomous  variable,  coded  as  “1”  in  a  given  year  if  the  number  of  inside  directors  decreased  
from  two  or  more  insiders  to  only  one  insider  (the  CEO)  and  “0”  otherwise.  Transitions to the
CEO-only insider structure were considered from 1981-2007, and were coded from Standard
and  Poor’s  Register  of  Corporations,  Directors  and  Executives  based  on  the  publication’s  
indication of insider status. Family members, for our purposes, were also considered insiders.
Firms are at risk of adopting the CEO-only structure only if they have at least one insider on the
board in addition to the CEO for at least one year. In our analysis, we sought to distinguish
between short-term CEO-only structures and longer-term shifts that demonstrated an effort to
create a permanent CEO-only structure. Therefore, to avoid short-term perturbations in board
structure, we only considered a firm as having a CEO-only structure if it lasted for more than two
years. Two years provides ample time for boards to re-appoint insiders (if they are so inclined)
and sensitivity analysis suggests that three and four year durations do not substantially change
the findings. In total, 144 events were observed within the 2,918 company-years of data in the

sample. Figure 1 shows the percentage of firms in the Fortune 250 that had the CEO-only
structure over the duration of the study. Whereas only around 5% of firms had the firm in the
first year of our panel, over half of firms possessed the structure by the last end of the panel.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Independent Variables
Proportion of insiders appointed before the CEO. To test our first hypothesis we
include a control for the proportion of inside directors other than the CEO who obtained their
board  seats  at  any  time  prior  to  the  current  CEO’s  arrival.    
CEO power. We utilize three measures of CEO power to assess the effects of CEO
power on the creation of the CEO-only board. This is consistent with prior suggestions that CEO
power is multidimensional. For example, Finkelstein (1992) developed and validated a set of
four dimensions of CEO power based on a variety of factors such as hierarchical position, stock
ownership and functional expertise. A number of subsequent studies have utilized derivatives or
subsets of the Finkelstein power measures to explore a host of outcomes (e.g. Cannella & Shen,
2001,Bigley & Wiersama, 2002). We follow Finkelstein and colleagues and utilize three of his
key measures of CEO power: functional background, duality, and stock ownership. We do not
rely on CEO tenure as a measure of power because of the confounding effects of impending
succession.    As  a  CEO’s  tenure  increases,  boards  are  more  likely  to  add  inside  directors  as  heir  
apparent to the CEO (Vancil, 1987; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Shen & Cannella, 2001).
However,  we  do  control  separately  for  a  CEO’s  relative  tenure,  as  described below.
CEO duality is  included  as  a  binary  variable,  coded  “1”  if  a  CEO  is  also  the  board  
chairman. This is one of the most widely used measures of CEO power (Wade et al., 1990),

argued  to  increase  the  CEO’s  ability  to  control  board  agendas    (Finkelstein & D’Aveni,  1994)  
and afford the CEO unity of command in complex environments (Boyd, 1995).
High levels of CEO stock ownership directly afford CEOs power through enhanced voting rights
(Zald, 1969). Because stock is also an important source of power for directors (Zajac &
Westphal, 1995), we use a relative measure of CEO stock ownership, calculated as the number of
outstanding shares held by the CEO divided by the total number of outstanding shares held by all
board members. CEO finance background was determined using the Forbes annual
compensation survey. Given that financial expertise is particularly critical for evaluation of firm
performance, we expect CEOs with financial backgrounds to be more likely to mobilize their
power to secure a CEO-only structure.  We  created  a  binary  variable  that  was  coded  “1”  if  a  CEO  
had a background in finance.
Sarbanes Oxley and its elaboration. We incorporate a period effect for Sarbanes Oxley
(SOX) in the model. The SOX variable  is  binary,  coded  “1”  for  the  years  2003  and  after,  after  
the law went into force. To test the elaboration of SOX we include a variable interacting the
SOX variable with whether the CEO has financial expertise.
Change in performance and its elaboration. To test Hypothesis 4, we include a variable
capturing change in performance,  which  is  coded  as  the  difference  in  the  firm’s  industryadjusted return-on-assets in the two prior years. We include interactions between this variable
and each of our three power indicators.
Control Variables
Alternative sources of board influence

We include four separate variables to control for separate factors that might affect the
CEO’s  relationship  with  other  members  of  the  board.      First,  we  control  for  relative CEO tenure,
measured as the ratio of the number of years the CEO has held their title divided by the average
number of years that other directors have held their board seats. Second, we include a binary
variable to control for firms in which the CEO is also the  firm’s  founder, as founders may have a
different relationship to board insiders than other CEOs. This is a binary variable that is coded
“1”  if  the  CEO  founded  the  organization  and  “0”  otherwise.    And  third,  we  include  a  control  for  
CEO age, as CEOs approaching retirement may cede some decision-making control to other
members of the board. Finally, to account for changes in  a  CEO’s  power  concomitant  with  
board structural changes, we include a binary control for change in duality,  coded  as  “1”  in  any  
year in which a company that had had a separate Chairman gave its CEO that title.
Larger  boards  might  have  more  “room”  for  both  insiders  and  outsiders,  potentially  
making it more difficult to adopt the CEO-only structure. Board size was calculated as the total
number of board members. Additionally, we include a control for the percentage of insiders on
the board. This variable, measured as the ratio of the number of insiders to the total number of
board members, accounts for the difficulty of eliminating a large proportion of board members in
one year. We also control for the number of insider departures at the firm, equal to the number
of board insiders who left the company in the prior firm-year. This measure accommodates a
host of voluntary and involuntary reasons that an insider may leave the firm – including, for
example, herding behavior following a CEO succession – and thus accounts for sources of
unobserved heterogeneity in changes to board structure. We also include a binary variable to
indicate all boards with a classified board structure. A classified board is one where only a

fraction of board members are up for renewal in any given year, preventing a wholesale
departure of insiders.
The power of outsiders has been shown to constrain CEO behavior and improve the
board’s  alignment  with  the  interests  of  shareholders.  However,  outsiders  also  have  a  
responsibility to provide advice and counsel to the CEO in decision making (Westphal, 1999)
and may benefit in this endeavor from the presence of other insiders. Although we do not
hypothesize an effect for outsider power, we suspect that these two competing interests -- that of
monitoring and counsel -- could leave outsiders somewhat indifferent to structural change. We
utilize two measures of outsider power. First, because outsiders who are recruited by the CEO
may be less likely to stand up to the CEO than outsiders who predate the CEO, we include a
control for the percentage of outsiders appointed by the CEO. Second, we include percentage
of outsider stock ownership, coded as the number of shares held by the outside members of the
board divided by the shares held by all board members.
Institutional investors are also a strong force in corporate governance (Davis &
Thompson, 1994; Useem, 1996). Institutional investors seek to increase outsider representation
on the board (Johnson & Greening, 1999), and is therefore likely that, institutional investors will
support moves to eliminate insiders from the board. The influence and activism of institutional
investors  is  likely  to  increase  when  they  hold  a  substantial  amount  of  a  company’s  shares.    
Therefore, to estimate the impact of institutional investors on board structural change, we include
a measure – blockholders -- that  captures  the  total  percentage  of  each  firm’s  shares  held  by  all  
institutional  investors  that  hold  a  minimum  of  a  5%  block  of  the  company’s  shares.    
Firm-specific controls

We include controls for several firm-level explanations of board-structural change. We
controlled for the level of performance using industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) because it
has been demonstrated to impact various dimensions of board changes (Shen & Cannella, 2002).
To control for the potential relationship between board structural change and managerial strategy
and discretion, we include controls for firm size, in terms of logged assets and logged sales; firm
age in years; resource availability in terms of cash on hand; and financial leverage in terms of
debt-to-equity (Finkelstein & D’Aveni  1994;;  Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). We examined firm
histories to account for previous CEO-only insider events, and recorded the number of times the
CEO-insider only structure had been previously adopted at the firm. We also included a control
for each firm’s   age, in years. And finally, we controlled for potential industry effects by
including fixed effects for each SIC major industry division represented in the sample. Summary
statistics and bivariate correlations of all dependent and independent variables are shown in
Table 1, below.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Analysis and Results
The analysis was conducted using a discrete-time event history analysis (Allison, 1984).
Though directors may rarely be replaced due to death or unforeseen events at other times in a
year, firms typically experience board changes once a year at their annual meeting when
shareholders vote on a slate of directors. In light of this, our model uses calendar year as the
time clock, with discrete time measures calculated for each calendar year. Given that firms
typically experience board change at their annual meetings, all firms that change to the CEOonly  structure  in  the  same  year  are  treated  in  the  model  as  ‘ties,’  meaning  that  they  are  coded  as  

experiencing the event at the same time, irrespective of when in the year they actually adopted
the structure. This aspect of our data drove our decision to employ the discrete time event
history model because it is capable of modeling ties, unlike continuous-time models -- such as
the Cox model -- that are unable to handle multiple, co-occurring events (Arjas and Kangas,
1992; Yamaguchi, 1991). Given that some firms in our sample were at risk of transitioning to the
CEO-only structure more than once (if they again brought in additional inside directors after two
years of having the CEO-only structure), we treated the measure as a repeatable event (Boeker,
1992; Zajac and Wesphal, 1996).
The results of the event history analysis of changes in board structure are displayed in
Table 2. We ran the models using both a simple probit and simple logit approach. We obtained
similar results using both approaches, but the probit approach yielded a lower BIC statistic,
suggesting that it was a better fit for our models. Thus, the results from the probit models are
shown below.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
We tested our hypotheses using a series of nested models. Model 1 includes only control
variables. Model 2 introduces the percentage of insiders appointed before the CEO in order to
test hypothesis 1. Model 3 tests hypothesis 2 by introducing variables to capture executive
power. In model 4, we test hypothesis 3 by introducing the SOX variable and its interaction with
CEOs with a finance background. Finally, in model 5, we test hypothesis 4 by introducing the
change in performance variable and its interactions with executive power.
The results for the control variables are consistent in each of the models. We do not find
evidence that block-holding institutional investors have a significant effect on the adoption of the

CEO-only structure.

Of course, our findings do not preclude the possibility that institutional

investors may push for greater board independence. They just may not work toward the
“extreme”  case  of  the  CEO-only insider structure. We also find no effects for firm-level
variables such as industry adjusted ROA, log of sales, firm age, debt-to-equity, or number of
previous CEO-only events.

We do find that board size is negatively associated with the event,

suggesting that boards with more seats to fill are more likely to keep other insiders on the board.
This is an especially interesting finding in light of larger trends toward shrinking board sizes.
Figure 2 shows the average board size and insider/outsider ratio for the firms in our sample over
the duration of the panel. As the figure suggests, board sizes decreased about 13% during the
panel, but the average number of outsiders on boards remained fairly steady over this period.
The trend toward smaller boards seems to be primarily explained by a near-50% decrease in the
average number of board insiders. Thus, whereas our results suggest that larger boards are less
likely to have the CEO-only structure, if boards continue to shrink we would expect to see the
structure continue to increase in prevalence.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
We do not find evidence of any significant relationship between classified board
structures and the event. The control for the percentage of insiders on the board was negative and
significant, which suggests that when the board is populated by a large percentage of insiders, it
may simply be too difficult to remove all of the insiders in a short period of time.

However, the

control for the number of insider departures is positive and significant, which suggests that
insiders may leave in waves: once some insiders leave the board, it becomes more likely that the
firm will remove all of its remaining insiders in the following year.

We  did  not  find  any  significant  relationship  between  a  CEO’s  tenure  relative  to  the  board  
and the structure. However, we do find that as CEOs age the CEO-only structure becomes less
likely, perhaps due to the increased likelihood of the presence of an internal heir apparent. The
control for the percentage of outsiders appointed by the CEO is positive and significant across
models 2-5. CEOs may have more power over directors that have been awarded board seats
under their watch, so this finding is consistent with our argument that powerful CEOs press for
adoption of the CEO-only structure.
The control we included for change in CEO/Chairman duality was positive and
significant across all models. This suggests that adoption of the CEO-only structure is more
likely to occur along with a concomitant event that necessitates changing the structure of the
board. Board members may be more open to adoption of the new structure when they are
already involved in a task that requires changing the roles or members of the board. And finally,
the number of firms that have adopted the CEO-only structure has a positive association with a
firm’s  likelihood of adopting the structure that is near to significance in models 1, 3, and 5. This
provides some evidence that mimetic pressures encourage firms to adopt the CEO-only structure.
We now turn to our hypotheses. Overall, the results in models 2-5 provide strong support
for hypothesis 1, on CEO interests. Consistent with hypothesis 1, boards with a larger percentage
of inside directors who predate the CEO are more likely to adopt the CEO-only insider structure
(p<.001). CEOs may not feel as advantaged by inside directors who they themselves did not
propose to the board.
Hypothesis 2 receives support in models 3-5, for some determinants of CEO power, but
not all. CEO duality has a positive and significant relationship with the adoption of the structure

across models 3-5 (p<.01). We do not find evidence, however, that  a  CEO’s  relative  share  
holdings or finance background has a significant main effect on the likelihood of the structure.
The results indicate that the agenda control concomitant to duality may give these CEOs more
leverage in altering board structure and composition, but other forms of CEO power do not have
the same effects. For the case of finance CEOs, their power may be less than we hypothesized
(cf., Ocasio & Kim, 1999).
Hypotheses 3, involving Sarbanes Oxley and its elaboration by CEOs with finance
backgrounds, received support in Models 4 and 5. As hypothesized, the interaction between SOX
and CEO finance background is positive and significant (p<.05), indicating that the CEO-only
structure was more likely after SOX in boards led by CEOs with financial expertise. SOX has a
marginally significant negative association with the structures. The main effect of the CEO with
a finance background is not significant, suggesting that SOX served as an elaboration
opportunity for finance CEOs. The interaction effect is graphically demonstrated in Figure 3,
below. The strongest predictor of adoption of the CEO-only structure is the percentage of
insiders on the board in the prior year. There is a very low probability of the structure being
adopted when the percentage of insiders is at its mean of roughly 25% of the board. However, as
the proportion of insiders drops below the mean, the conditional probability of the CEO-only
structure increases dramatically and the interactions we explore here become important
predictors of when the structure is likely to occur. This suggests that the elaboration mechanisms
we propose become most important when there are already relatively few insiders on the board.
Thus, in the figure below, we have held the percentage of insiders at one standard deviation
below the mean (roughly 13%). All other control variables are held at their mean. As can be

seen in the figure, the predicted likelihood of adoption of the CEO-only structure was similar (at
around a 4% probability) regardless of whether a CEO had a finance background before SOX,
but firms that have CEOs with finance backgrounds are about ten times more likely to adopt the
structure after SOX than firms that have CEOs with no finance background.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
We also receive support for hypothesis 4, for two of the three measures of power, which
suggests that powerful CEOs can leverage outperformance to press for adoption of the CEO-only
structure. The main effect of change in performance is not significant, nor is its interaction with
CEOs with a finance background. However, we do find significant and positive interactions
between changes in performance and both CEO duality (p<.05) and  CEOs’  relative  
shareholdings (p<.01). These interactions are depicted in Figures 4 and 5, below. Again, the
percentage of insiders is held at one standard deviation below the mean in these figures and all
other controls are held at their mean. Figure 4 shows that firms with dual CEO/Chairman
become more likely to adopt the structure as their change in performance improves, but those
with a separate CEO and Chairman become less likely to adopt the structure as performance
improves. Figure 5 suggests that for firms where industry-adjusted ROA has increased by 1 over
the prior year, there is an almost 15% probability of the structure occurring in boards where
CEOs  hold  75%  of  the  board’s  total  shares, which is around four times more likely than in firms
where  the  CEO  holds  25%  of  the  board’s  total  shares.
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here]
DISCUSSION

In this paper, we explore the proliferation of a paradoxical phenomenon in corporate
governance, the CEO-only board structure, where the CEO is the only insider on the board. The
structure has spread without much notice or remark because it appears to neatly accord with the
director independence mandate derived from agency theory and the logic of shareholder value.
However, a growing body of evidence in management research and finance suggests that the
CEO-only structure may in fact enhance the power and entrenchment of CEOs, leading to
monitoring inefficiencies (Liu & Jiraporn, 2008), increased managerial excess (Zorn, Shropshire,
Martin & Combs, 2013) and greater CEO influence (Adams et al, 2005). This evidence sparks
our overarching research question: why do structures proliferate that appear to align with the
objectives of a dominant institutional logic, but that work in practice to contravene those
objectives?
To answer this question, we propose that the CEO-only structure exemplifies the
phenomenon of structural elaboration, originally developed in the context of coercive
institutional change, and extended here to apply to changes in institutional logics. Structural
elaboration theory (Edelman, 1992) contends that organizations strategically respond to
ambiguous institutional demands by adopting structures that appear to conform, but that work in
reality to enhance executive interests. While the CEO-only structure is an elaborated form of
board independence, a mandate derived from agency theory and the logic of shareholder value,
we argue that the structure  enhances  the  CEO’s  interests  by  proffering  an  information  brokerage  
position and removing potential internal challengers.
Having identified the CEO-only structure as an example of structural elaboration, we
explore the proliferation of the structure as an opportunity to construct and test a more precise

theoretical model of the mechanisms that drive processes of structural elaboration: executive
interests, executive power, and elaboration opportunities. Our basic premise is that CEO
interests and power have a direct effect on what structural changes are made in response to
pressures from new institutional logics. Specifically, we contend that the structures that
proliferate in response to new logics will be consistent with the interests of powerful
organizational executives, in our case the CEO. Executive power is not, however, monolithic,
but is moderated by institutional events and organizational contingencies. In light of this, we
propose that the timing of the adoption of new structures will be shaped by institutional events
(like the passage of Sarbanes Oxley) or organizational contingencies (like increases in
performance). Each of these examples of elaboration opportunities spark power mobilization and
increase the likelihood that structures will be altered in ways that accord with the interests of
powerful executives as well as the expectations of prevailing logics.
The present study has several limitations. First, our sample includes only the largest U.S.
public corporations. Small, family-owned or otherwise private organizations may have different
political dynamics, particularly when a founding family member is present. Second, given the
many multi-divisional firms in our sample, finance backgrounds may be particularly important
because of their usefulness in devising acquisition and diversification strategies (Song, 1982;
Palmer & Barber, 2001). Consequently, our indicators of financial expertise may be less
applicable to other contexts. Third, like other large sample studies of boards of directors, this
study does not directly observe the political processes by which power is exercised or mobilized
(Pettigrew, 1992; Zajac & Westphal, 1996).

Our focus on the interests of powerful executives, in particular, highlights an important
assumption in our model: that CEOs perceive CEO-only boards as being in their own selfinterest. Although we cannot directly test this relationship, as interests are inherently
unobservable, it is a view shared by financial economists and organizational scholars that is
informed by a growing body of empirical evidence that this structure advantages CEOs (e.g.
Adams et al, 2005; Liu & Jiraporn, 2008; Hoechle, Schmid, Walter& Yermak, 2012; Zorn et al.,
2013). Moreover, model-theoretic approaches to social inquiry suggest that constructs like “selfinterests”  provide useful guidance on the nature of expected relationships even when they do not
lead to directly testable hypotheses (Harris, Johnson and Souder, 2013).2 Indeed, the agency
theoretic expectation that CEOs prefer to have insiders on their board because they expect
insiders to be less diligent monitors has, to our knowledge, never been tested directly, but has
been similarly employed as a springboard to testable hypotheses. Our assumption that CEOs
prefer the CEO-only structure to alternate forms of independent-majority structures, which is
grounded in a rich literature on socio-political processes on corporate boards (Zajac & Westphal,
1996), recognizes that the proposed associations will not hold under all conditions (Tsang and
Kwan, 1999), but still demonstrates an empirical regularity that informs and refines our
scholarship on models of board structural change.

Along these lines, realists in the philosophy of social science (e.g. Bhaskar, 1975; Godfrey and Hill, 1985) argue
that testing theory for its veracity should not require the measurement of observable variables. Many  “real”  
mechanisms are not directly observable but are, nevertheless, essential for understanding causal forces. In
organizational and strategy research, examples include divergent interests in agency theory, tacit resources in the
resource based view, and perceived opportunism in transaction costs economics.
2

Our study offers several contributions to the literature. First, we extend structural
elaboration theory to the domain of corporate governance, using the theory to explain why firms
adopt governance structures that ostensibly accord with the expectations of a dominant
institutional  logic,  but  in  actuality  diverge  from  the  logic’s  underlying  principles. While
Edelman applied structural elaboration to ambiguous changes in the law, we suggest that the
theory can also be applied to understand organizational responses to ambiguous prescriptions of
institutional logics. In so doing, we introduce structural elaboration as a lens to explain variation
in the way institutional logics are instantiated inside organizations. Moreover, we augment
structural elaboration theory by drawing from the socio-political perspective on corporate
governance.    Whereas  Edelman’s  (1992)  account  focuses  more  on  inter-organizational political
dynamics, we focus on the intra-organizational political dynamics at the board level board that
drive the elaboration of institutional logics. We argue and demonstrate that board structural
change is shaped by the interest of powerful players in the organization (in particular, the CEO)
as well as the opportunities to elaborate practices. By merging structural elaboration theory with
the socio-political perspective, a breed of theoretical contribution Harris et al. (2013) recently
referred  to  as  “grafting,”  we  are able to provide a more nuanced and precise theoretical model of
how structural elaboration proceeds in practice.
We also add to the institutional logics literature by examining the role of structural
elaboration in shaping the way institutional logics are realized inside organizations. Our focus
on power, interests and opportunities as links between logics and agency, captures more fully
how key organizational actors shape choices concerning the adoption and variation of practices
and structures that reinforce existing logics. (Thornton et al, 2012). More generally, by focusing

on the role of executive power and political opportunities undergirding structural elaboration, our
theory answers the call for more attention to the micro-foundations of institutions (Thornton et
al., 2012; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Zucker, 1991). Locally-constructed conceptions of
institutions,  such  as  Hallett  &  Ventresca’s  (2006)  theory  of  ‘inhabited  institutions’  or  Thornton  et  
al’s  (2012)  conception  of  negotiated  order  stress  that  institutions actually arise in the interaction
between macro-level pressures and organization-level contingencies. These middle-range
conceptions of institutions suggest that institutional myths are not merely handed down as rigid
mandates  or  ‘iron  cages’  (DiMaggio  & Powell, 1983), but are interpreted among actors seeking
to appropriately respond to institutional expectations (Hallett, 2010). Our study augments this
work and demonstrates the potential for practice variation and unintended contradictions
between the underlying theoretical principles of agency theory and shareholder value
maximization and the practices of the shareholder value logic. This incremental structural
change has the potential to generate internal contradictions in the shareholder value logic, which
could result in subsequent changes in the logic (Seo & Creed, 2002). Our concept of elaboration
opportunities is similar to what has previously been referred to as choice opportunities (March &
Olsen’s,  1976),  policy  windows  (Kingdon,  1984)  and  windows of opportunity (Tyre &
Orlikowski, 1994). It reflects a situated view of decision making which emphasizes the
influence of situational characteristics on the critical issues and solutions that constitute the
decision makers focus of attention (Ocasio, 1997). The concept of elaboration opportunity builds
on related approaches by recognizing that opportunities for change are influenced simultaneously
by institutional logics, decision-making situations and individual interests. Institutional and
organizational events generate the attention of actors who have distinct preferences and

capacities for influencing structural changes (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). Thus, structural change
occurs in part because logics and more proximate influences provide social actors with impetus
and motivation for elaboration and development of the extant logic.
At the same time, the concept of elaboration opportunity recognizes that power cannot be
exerted under all conditions (March, 1966; Kingdon, 1984). Consequently, some elaboration
opportunities  offer  better  timing  to  assert  a  policy  change  than  others.    Since,  the  CEO’s  efforts  
to  exert  power  are  partly  context  dependent,  the  probability  of  the  CEO’s  political  activity  
increases with the presence of particular elaboration opportunities. The CEO, as an experienced
political player (Vancil, 1987), will have a sense for whether the organizational context is
favorable for political activity which supports their position and status.
This is consistent with the adoption patterns evident in our data. The adoption pattern of
the CEO-only structure was uneven, and it was not marked by a watershed event. It evolved
rather quietly and incrementally over time. Few firms (11) in our sample adopted the structure in
the 1980s. Of those firms that had the structure at the start of our analysis – Coca-Cola,
Conagra, Consolidated Freightways, Digital Equipment, Entergy, Northwest Airlines, Norwest
and Weyerhauser – only Digital Equipment and Entergy had the structure at founding. Digital
was led by its co-founder Kenneth Olsen and Entergy was controlled by utility regulators who
could set the rate of return for shareholders and limit managerial discretion (Demsetz, 1983).
Most firms (69) adopted the structure in the 1990s, including IBM, which serves as a canonical
example of our model. At the time of the transition to a CEO-only board, Gerstner held both the
Chair and CEO positions and owned 473,333 shares at the time of transition to CEO-only which
was 93.6% of total shares held by board members. He was also only three years into his twelve-

year tenure, but was leading a successful turnaround. Gerstner had control of the board agenda
and his  firm’s  superior  performance  provided  an organizational opportunity to make changes.
This focus on opportunities may be a fruitful one for future researchers and additional
work is needed to identify the role of decision opportunities in shaping power activation in other
contexts and how they affect the elaboration of other structures and processes. Although not a
focus of the present study, the historical trajectory of the CEO-only board structure does suggest
that the individual agency of structural elaboration has the potential for change – or at least
refinement - of the extant logic. More studies are needed to understand the role of elaboration in
the development and transformation of institutional logics, and the endogenous process of
institutional change more generally. In all, the elusive and recursive link between institutional
and organizational change is an important one, and hopefully our study provides insights into
one part of that process in articulating a concrete link between changes in the institutional
environment and structural elaboration at the organizational level – of which board structure is
but one example.
CONCLUSION
This paper explores the structural elaboration of organizational logics in the context of
corporate governance. We began our paper by noting a paradox: the adoption of the CEO-only
structure appears to conform to agency theory and shareholder value logics, but prior analyses of
its empirical effects suggest that it works in practice to enrich and entrench the CEO, contrary to
the shareholder value logic’s  ultimate  objective.    We resolve this paradox by finding evidence
that while the principles of the shareholder value logic are apparently upheld by the adoption of

the CEO-only structure, this structure in actuality is favored by powerful CEOs, and more so
when it serves to remove insiders not explicitly beholden to the CEO for their board positions.
Our application of structural elaboration theory to corporate governance reminds us that
institutional logics are inherently ambiguous, and that the application of their principles may not
always serve their desired purposes, but instead serve the interests of powerful elites. Board
independence is a taken-for-granted feature of the shareholder value logic, and supermajority
outsider boards an established desiderata. Yet with the adoption of CEO-only boards, powerful
CEOs  embrace  a  structure  that  conforms  to  the  principle  of  “board  independence,”  albeit  one  that  
research has shown to facilitate the opposite, greater CEO entrenchment.
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Figure 2. Changes in board structure: 1981 - 2008
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Figure 3. Predicted Probability of the CEO-Only Structure, Demonstrating the Interaction
of Sarbanes Oxley and CEOs with a Finance Background
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Figure 4. Predicted Probability of the CEO-Only Structure, Demonstrating the Interaction
of Change in Performance and CEO Duality
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Figure 5. Predicted Probability of the CEO-Only Structure, Demonstrating the Interaction
of  Change  in  Performance  and  CEO’s  Relative  Shares
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Table
Name
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
1
2
3
4
5
1 CEO-Only Event
0.043
0.20
0.00
1.00 1.000
2 CEO Duality
0.781
0.41
0.00
1.00 -0.080 1.000
3 CEO Relative Shares
0.263
0.28
0.00
1.00 0.064 0.143 1.000
4 CEO is Founder
0.042
0.20
0.00
1.00 -0.009 0.034 0.197 1.000
5 CEO Finance Background
0.238
0.43
0.00
1.00 0.021 -0.040 -0.028 -0.059 1.000
6 % Insiders Predating CEO
0.638
0.42
0.00
1.00 0.163 -0.221 -0.178 -0.195 -0.020
7 Sarbanes Oxley
0.099
0.30
0.00
1.00 0.103 -0.123 0.067 -0.048 -0.026
8 Change in Performance
0.005
0.66
-9.51
9.09 0.041 -0.009 0.008 -0.005 0.016
9 CEO Relative Tenure
0.859
0.87
0.00
6.46 -0.065 0.227 0.192 0.267 0.000
10 % Outsiders Appt. by CEO
0.376
0.35
0.00
1.00 -0.072 0.229 0.213 0.261 -0.003
11 CEO Age
56.682
6.60
33.00
92.00 -0.075 0.214 0.084 -0.005 0.003
12 Logged Assets
9.358
1.40
4.22
14.60 0.059 0.014 -0.027 -0.193 0.288
13 % Board Shares Held by Outsiders
0.307
0.32
0.00
1.00 0.005 -0.037 -0.367 -0.132 0.047
14 Cash
1223.876 3291.44 -150.17 40412.00 0.053 -0.017 -0.010 -0.065 0.208
15 DebttoEquity
6769.244 28169.98
0.00 486876.00 0.018 -0.012 -0.001 -0.043 0.056
16 Classified Board
0.528
0.50
0.00
1.00 0.000 0.071 0.043 0.035 -0.087
17 Board Size
14.133
3.91
2.00
43.00 -0.078 0.077 -0.187 -0.145 0.210
18 Percentage Insiders on Board
0.259
0.12
0.07
1.00 -0.124 -0.166 -0.070 0.117 -0.115
19 Change in Duality
0.059
0.23
0.00
1.00 0.231 -0.486 -0.069 -0.025 -0.008
20 Insider Departures
0.108
0.39
0.00
5.00 0.063 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.028
21 # Other Firms with Structure
39.692
22.82
11.00
87.00 0.157 -0.130 0.133 -0.099 -0.032
22 Industry Adjusted ROA
0.168
0.57
-3.46
9.56 0.047 -0.036 0.029 -0.018 -0.069
23 Logged Sales
9.105
0.99
2.52
12.75 0.057 0.006 0.010 -0.217 -0.008
24 Firm Age
77.221
42.43
-15.00
197.00 0.040 0.088 -0.016 -0.261 0.072
25 Prior CEO-Only Events
0.096
0.32
0.00
3.00 0.116 -0.068 0.029 -0.063 0.006
26 Blockholders
2.452
8.00
0.00
99.72 0.036 -0.046 0.020 -0.024 -0.005
Table continued on next page

6 % Insiders Predating CEO
7 Sarbanes Oxley
8 Change in Performance
9 CEO Relative Tenure
10 % Outsiders Appt. by CEO
11 CEO Age
12 Logged Assets
13 % Board Shares Held by Outsiders
14 Cash
15 DebttoEquity
16 Classified Board
17 Board Size
18 Percentage Insiders on Board
19 Change in Duality
20 Insider Departures
21 # Other Firms with Structure
22 Industry Adjusted ROA
23 Logged Sales
24 Firm Age
25 Prior CEO-Only Events
26 Blockholders

16 Classified Board
17 Board Size
18 Percentage Insiders on Board
19 Change in Duality
20 Insider Departures
21 # Other Firms with Structure
22 Industry Adjusted ROA
23 Logged Sales
24 Firm Age
25 Prior CEO-Only Events
26 Blockholders

6
1.000
0.051
0.020
-0.504
-0.490
-0.279
0.038
0.087
0.002
0.019
-0.019
-0.015
-0.009
0.082
0.026
0.074
0.019
0.065
0.077
0.028
0.010
15
-0.134
0.080
-0.078
0.010
0.020
0.213
-0.017
0.303
0.045
0.151
-0.017

16
1.000
-0.076
0.060
-0.019
0.027
-0.066
0.027
-0.107
0.048
-0.039
0.028

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1.000
-0.016
-0.041
-0.053
-0.010
0.238
0.062
0.253
0.188
-0.054
-0.104
-0.125
0.047
-0.010
0.583
0.083
0.265
0.104
0.293
-0.080

1.000
-0.018
-0.029
0.006
0.006
-0.002
-0.010
0.000
0.003
-0.002
-0.011
0.013
0.012
0.021
0.599
0.001
0.002
-0.015
0.026

1.000
0.831
0.265
-0.112
-0.144
-0.036
-0.018
0.053
-0.017
0.125
-0.149
-0.002
-0.052
-0.031
-0.126
-0.142
-0.062
-0.005

1.000
0.217
-0.108
-0.133
-0.042
-0.019
0.057
-0.012
0.121
-0.172
0.001
-0.077
-0.026
-0.114
-0.151
-0.079
-0.007

1.000
0.107
-0.036
-0.007
-0.022
0.019
0.103
-0.015
-0.075
0.014
0.035
-0.012
0.172
0.083
-0.041
0.025

1.000
0.062
0.569
0.424
-0.225
0.344
-0.285
0.014
0.009
0.422
0.012
0.746
0.193
0.117
0.019

1.000
0.059
-0.029
-0.049
0.168
-0.234
0.028
0.013
-0.051
-0.022
-0.006
0.033
0.048
-0.017

1.000
0.370
-0.168
0.182
-0.167
0.039
0.011
0.275
0.006
0.383
0.147
0.032
-0.019

17

18

19

20

21

22

1.000
-0.223
0.007
0.065
-0.199
-0.078
0.172
0.198
-0.113
-0.102

1.000
0.016
0.119
-0.231
0.005
-0.183
-0.130
-0.148
-0.065

1.000
0.020
0.063
0.010
0.022
0.020
0.051
0.010

1.000
-0.013
-0.007
0.032
-0.009
-0.040
-0.014

1.000
0.157
0.498
0.144
0.347
0.220

1.000
0.065
0.021
0.037
0.043

23

24

25

1.000
0.205 1.000
0.122 0.092 1.000
0.077 -0.007 0.077

Table 2. Discrete Time Event History Analysis of the Likelihood of Adoption of the CEOonly Structure
Model 1

Model 2
1.871***
(0.33)

Model 3
1.994***
(0.36)
0.828***
(0.23)
0.311
(0.27)
0.275
(0.42)
0.23
(0.16)

Model 4
2.024***
(0.37)
0.770**
(0.24)
0.297
(0.28)
0.278
(0.43)
0.0447
(0.19)
-0.391+
(0.23)
0.859*
(0.37)

Model 5
2.055***
(0.39)
0.741**
(0.23)
0.256
(0.28)
0.324
(0.43)
0.0511
(0.19)
-0.418+
(0.24)
0.838*
(0.39)
-0.391**
(0.14)
0.510*
(0.22)
1.133**
(0.38)
-0.584
(0.42)
0.159
(0.17)

-0.325
(0.20)

0.243
(0.20)

0.122
(0.23)

0.0991
(0.23)

0.0855
(0.23)

% Outsiders Appointed
By CEO

0.625
(0.41)

0.696
(0.42)

0.802+
(0.44)

0.889*
(0.44)

0.972*
(0.45)

CEO Age

-0.0319**
(0.01)

-0.0383**
(0.01)

-0.0428*** -0.0412**
(0.01)
(0.01)

-0.0432***
(0.01)

Logged Assets

0.137
(0.12)

0.0585
(0.15)

0.0596
(0.15)

0.0651
(0.15)

0.131
(0.16)

% Board Shares Held by
Outsiders

-0.308+
(0.19)

-0.516*
(0.20)

-0.359
(0.23)

-0.377
(0.23)

-0.358
(0.24)

% Insiders Predating the CEO
CEO Duality
CEO Relative Shares
CEO is Founder
CEO Finance Background
Sarbanes Oxley (SOX)
SOX x Finance Background
Δ  Performance
Δ  Perf.  x  Duality
Δ  Perf.  x  Relative  Shares
Δ  Perf.  x  Founder
Δ  Perf.  x  Fin.  Background
Controls
CEO Relative Tenure

Table 2. Discrete Time Event History Analysis of the Likelihood of Adoption of the CEOonly Structure (cont’d)
Cash

1.61E-05
(0.00)
-2.22E-06
(0.00)
0.182
(0.12)
-0.244***
(0.04)
-14.78***
(2.41)
1.755***
(0.17)
0.895***
(0.14)

2.77E-05
(0.00)
-3.00E-06
(0.00)
0.202
(0.14)
-0.239***
(0.05)
-15.61***
(2.67)
1.965***
(0.20)
0.949***
(0.14)

3.37E-05*
(0.00)
-1.90E-06
(0.00)
0.231
(0.14)
-0.231***
(0.05)
-15.57***
(2.81)
2.660***
(0.29)
0.930***
(0.15)

3.76E-05*
(0.00)
-2.14E-06
(0.00)
0.209
(0.14)
-0.230***
(0.05)
-15.58***
(2.80)
2.610***
(0.29)
0.948***
(0.15)

3.84E-05*
(0.00)
-2.73E-06
(0.00)
0.191
(0.14)
-0.240***
(0.05)
-16.21***
(2.42)
2.629***
(0.29)
0.999***
(0.14)

# Other Companies with
CEO-Only Structure

0.00600
(0.00)

0.00570
(0.00)

0.00738+
(0.00)

0.00795
(0.00)

0.00859+
(0.01)

Industry Adjusted ROA

0.0843
(0.09)
-0.113
(0.15)
0.00214
(0.00)
0.078
(0.11)
-0.00987
(0.01)

0.0623
(0.09)
0.0177
(0.18)
0.00224
(0.00)
0.0658
(0.13)
-0.0111
(0.01)

0.0754
(0.10)
-0.0501
(0.19)
0.00141
(0.00)
0.132
(0.14)
-0.0111
(0.01)

0.106
(0.10)
-0.0522
(0.18)
0.00124
(0.00)
0.0961
(0.14)
-0.0108
(0.01)

-0.242
(0.22)
-0.113
(0.18)
0.00122
(0.00)
0.111
(0.14)
-0.0113
(0.01)

0.261
(1.30)
-281.62
0.39
2918

-0.783
(1.45)
-243.61
0.47
2918

-0.838
(1.55)
-235.18
0.49
2918

-0.621
(1.51)
-232.47
0.49
2918

-0.213
(1.40)
-227.71
0.51
2918

DebttoEquity
Classified Board
Board Size
% Insiders on Board
Change in Duality
# Board Departures

Logged Sales
Firm Age
Prior CEO-Only Events
% Held by Blockholders

Constant
Log Pseudolikelihood
Pseudo R^2
N

Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Fixed effects for industry by SIC major sector are
included in the model but not shown here.
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

